Commonwealth v. Ardestani, 736 A.2d 552 (Pa. 1999): Commonwealth v. Brion held to apply retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal at the time of the decision--full discussion of retroactivity principles under the State Constitution.

Commonwealth v. Darush, 740 A.2d 722 (Super. Ct. 1999): Article I, section 8 is violated when a defendant's home telephone conversation, with an undercover agent, is recorded without a warrant.

Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 719 A.2d 754 (Pa. Super. 1998): Counsel ineffective for failing to raise search issue under the State Constitution. [This case may signal a new attitude toward the failure to raise state constitutional issues when federal constitutional issues are raised.]

Kleese v. Pennsylvania State Board of Funeral Directors, 738 A.2d 523 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999): Reference by party to "freedom of commercial speech" sufficient, even in the absence of citation to either the federal or Pennsylvania constitutions, to raise constitutional issue.

In re Cicchetti, 743 A.2d 431 (January 13, 2000): Justice Newman held for the court that in the future, court-appointed employees may not participate in judicial retention eleciton campaigns.

In re T.J., 739 A.2d 478 (Pa. 1999): County mental health office has standing to contest decision not to extend mental patient's involuntary commitment despite mootness because the matter "raises an issue of an important public interest, and is an issue which is capable of repetition and yet apt to evade review"; administrative agency has standing to litigate matters that "'touch [] upon its concerns' "(citing Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Environmental Resourses, 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989)).

Article I:

Section 1--In the Matter of K.D., R.D., 744 A.2d 760 (Pa. Super. 1999) [WL 1063177]: Mandatory psychological evaluation reversed as violative of mother's privacy rights pursuant to child dependency proceeding.

Section 6--Commonwealth v. Downey, 732 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999): Denial of motion to poll jury made after verdict is recorded but before the jury disperses, held reversible error even without a showing of prejudice by the defendant.

Wertz v. Chapman Township, 741 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 1999): Civil jury trial provision, Art. I, section 6, does not require a jury trial in a damage action for sexual discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The standard for applying Art. I, section 6 is, in part, whether a jury trial would have been available under such a claim when the Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted. The majority acknowledges that this test is narrower than that applied under the 7th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Section 7--Philadelphia Fraternal Order of Correctional Officers v. Rendell, 736 A.2d 573 (Pa. 1999): City ordinance specifying particular union as collective bargaining agent does not violate Pennsylvania Constitutional rights of speech, association or equal protection.

Section 8--Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1999): State Constitution does not require knowing and intelligent, as opposed to voluntary, consent to otherwise unconstitutional search; therefore, the Commonwealth need not show that the subject knew there was a right to refuse consent to the search.

Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1999): The court applies Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to uphold the admission of abandoned property into evidence, since reasonable suspicion had justified the original police approach. [The court had previously rejected California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)--Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (1996)--and thus, required police justification even though the defendant ran away when approached by the police. There was, however, no majority opinion in Cook. Justices Saylor and Castill seem ready to overrule Matos. Chief Justice Flaherty did not state his position.]

Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588 (Pa. Super. 1999): Court follows Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) as the proper standard under the State Constitution and permits a "protective sweep" of a private home pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. [The court conducted a four-factor Edmunds analysis.]

In Re F.B., 726 A.2d 361 (Pa. 1999): Upholds general search of high school students as pre-condition to entry to the school and sets forth framework for evaluating such searches under the State Constitution.

Section 9--Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1999): State constitutional right to counsel is coterminous with the federal sixth amendment as far as when the rights attaches is concerned.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999): Provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law for registration of certain sexual offenders held to violate federal procedural due process. [The Court expressly avoided determining the parallel reach of Art. I, section 9, see 608, n. 17.]

Section 10--Commonwealth v. Martorano, 741 A.2d 1221 (Pa. 1999) [WL 1023336]: Applies the state constitutional double jeopardy standard of Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1999), ["conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial" 615 A.2d at 325], which is broader than the federal standard, to prohibit retrial in context of prosecutorial bad faith throughout the trial.

Section 14--Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999): In the course of affirming the denial of P.C.R.A. relief in a death penalty case, the court applies PCRA to claims of penalty phase error on the ground, in part, that the prohibition against suspension of the writ of habeas corpus would prevent the legislature from foreclosing any claims that would have been cognizable on traditional habeas corpus review.

Section 17--Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1999): Registration requirements of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law do not constitute "punishment" and therefore do not violate either Pennsylvania or federal ex post facto protections.

Article III:

Section 12--Commonwealth v. Sanders, 743 A.2d 970 (Pa. Super 12/22/99): 1995 PCRA reforms upheld, as not outside the subject designated in the Governor's call to the 1995 special session of the General Assembly.

Section 14--Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999): The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Flaherty, with three Justices concurring in the result, affirms the dismissal by the Commonwealth Court of a challenge brought under Article III, section 14, to the Pennsylvania public education funding system. The Court agrees that such a challenge raises a nonjusticiable political question. [The same day, the Court, in a per curiam order, affirmed the Commonwealth Court's dismissal of another school funding case.]

Section 26--Denbow v. Borough of Leetsdale, 729 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1999): Article III, section 26, which prohibits "extra compensation" to public employees applies to municipalities, rather than just to the General Assembly, and prevents the Borough from granting the pay increases at issue in the case. [The applicability of Article III, section 26, to local government was an issue of first impression.]

Article V:

Section 10--Commonwealth v. Ex Rel. Unified Judicial System, 733 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 1999): "Deliberative process privilege" held to bar subpeona of former Chief Justice in civil suit for breach of contract arising out of construction and lease of courthouse.

L.J.S. v. State Ethics Commission, 744 A.2d 798 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999): (en banc): The State Ethics Commission lacks authority to investigate a chief adult probation officer of the Court of Common Pleas because of the State Supreme Court's exclusive authority to supervise the Judicial Branch.

Shaulis v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 739 A.2d 1091 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999): Application of State Ethics Act to bar attorney from representation before governmental body for one year after retirement from that body violates the State Supreme Court's exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. [The court distinguished P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 723 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1999)].

Section 15--In re Cicchetti, 743 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2000): In the future, court-appointed employees may not participate in judicial retention elections campaigns.

Article VIII:

Section 1--City of Allentown v. MSG Associates, 747 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000): Upholds different tax rate on services than sales against uniformity challenge under Art. VIII, section 1. The Court expressly overrules Commonwealth v. Mercadante, 676 A.2d 1307 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).

Section 2--Betsy King LPGA Classic v. Richmond, 739 A.2d 612 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999): Tournament and related charitable corporation are not institutions of purely public charity exempt from local amusement tax because, although these entities provide funds to federally tax exempt organizations, "the overwhelming majority of revenue generated" go to golf tournament purse.

Wilson Area School District v. Easton Hospital, 747 A.2d 877 (Pa. 2000): Upholds the tax exempt status of the hospital as "entirely free from a private profit motive" because all distributions of surplus revenue were made either with expectation of repayment or in order to increase the efficiency of hospital operations.

Section 8--Giordano v. Ridge, 737 A.2d 350 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999): Upholds Capital Facilities Enabling Act against challenge that credit of Commonwealth was unconstitutionally pledged-taxpayer petition for review fails to state a cause of action.

Article XI:

Section 1--Bergdoll v. Kane, 731 A.2d 1261 (Pa. June 15, 1999): Constitutional amendment to Article I, section 9, which was approved by the voters on November 7, 1995, held unconstitutional as constituting in effect two amendments that should have been voted on separately. [The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the Commonwealth Court at 694 A.2d 1155 (Pa. Commwlth. 1997).]

Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 727 A.2d 632 (Pa. Commwlth. 1999): Constitutional amendment to the Board of Pardons provision, Article IV, section 9, which was approved by the voters on November 4, 1997, held unconstitutional as constituting in effect several amendments that should have been voted on separately.