Methodological Provisions:-

In re Appeal of Tenet Healthsystems, 880 A.2d 721 (Pa. Comwlth. 8/10/2005), panel, per Leavitt, J., holds that attorney's mistaken reliance on an erroneous version of a statute in Purdon's Statutes, an unofficial statutory compilation, did not merit nunc pro tun appeal, at least where the error in question was contained in only one section of a statute and a careful reading of the entire statute in its unofficial form would have alerted the attorney to the error

Benn v. First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, 426 F.3d 233 (3rd Cir. 2005): Judge Sloviter holds for a unanimous panel that the Judicial District is a state entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in suit under Americans with Disabilities Act.

Pennsylvania School Boards Ass'n v. Barnes, 885 A.2d 97 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): panel, per Colins, P.J., holds that school boards lack standing to challenge Act 72, which introduced a scheme for property tax reduction the plaintiffs alleged violated, inter alia, Article VIII, section 2 (homestead and farmstead exemptions).

In re Administrative Order No. 1-MD-2003, 882 A.2d 1049 (Pa. Cmwlth. 9/13/2005): court, per Colins, P.J., holds that Clerk of Courts of Berks County lacks standing to challenge expungement order Clerk believes violates Clerk's duty to keep records for public inspection. Judge Leavitt dissents.

Article I:

Section 1--Christie v. Borough of Folcroft, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2005 WL 2396762 (E.D. Pa. 10/27/2005)---despite state constitutional protection of reputation, federal court will apply standard of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) to section 1983 reputation due process claim arising from acts occurring in Pennsylvania.

Pennsylvania State University v. State Employees' Retirement Board, 880 A.2d 757 (Pa. Cmlth. 2005): The Commonwealth Court, en banc, per McGinley, J., held that the salaries of certain prominent employees of PSU, including Joe Paterno, were public records under the Right to Know Act (RTKA).

See infra Article III, section 32 D.C., K.C., and K.J. v. School District of Philadelphia, 879 A.2d 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

Section 3--Religious Freedom

Combs v. Homer Center School District, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2005 WL 3338885 (W.D. Pa. 12/8/2005)--In an action brought by home schooling parents, Judge Schwab upholds the Pennsylvania Home Schooling Act (Act 169) against federal and state claims, including facial violation of the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, which is premised on Art. I, section 3.

Weber v. Dubois Area School District, 2005 WL 3338885 (W.D. Pa. 2005): per Schwab, J.--in a wide-ranging opinion canvassing the background of compulsory schooling in Pennsylvania history and law, the court denies both federal constitutional and Pennsylvania statutory facial challenges to the 1988 Home Schooling Act; plaintiffs had argued that the Act was an interference with the religious rights of home schooling families; the Pennsylvania statutory challenge was based on the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, which is premised on Article I, section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Deveaux v. City of Philadelphia, ___ A.2d ___, 2005 WL 1869666 (Pa.Com.Pl., July 14, 2005)--Although technically an application of the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, Philadelphia Common Pleas Judge Dych held that Philadelphia could require a Muslim firefighter to shave his beard, despite the RFPA and the separation of powers.

Section 8--Commonwealth v. Sands, ___ A.2d ___, 2005 WL 2863123 (Pa. Super. November 2, 2005): the court holds that amended section 6308(b) lowered the standard for a traffic stop from probable cause to reasonable suspicion and that this change was constitutional.

Section 11--Pa. Childcare LLC v. Flood, 887 A.2d 309 (Pa. Super. 2005): panel, per Bowes, J., reverses order of Court of Common Pleas sealing judicial proceedings involving privately owned juvenile detention facility with County contract. The trial court sealed the proceedings under the Pennsylvania Trade Secrets Act. The panel holds that the interest asserted does not outweigh the presumption of openness of judicial proceedings under both the first amendment and Article I, section 11.

Erdely v. Hinchcliffe and Keener, Inc., 875 A.2d 1078 (Pa. Super. 2005): Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law permitting corporate dissolution to abate a potential cause of action for asbestos exposure does not violate Pennsylvania Constitution's remedy clause.

Commonwealth v. Long, 871 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super. 2005): media interveners did not have the right to the names and addresses of jurors in a high-profile homicide trial. The court noted that the open courts provision in Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides no greater right of access than does the federal first amendment.

Section 14--Commonwealth v. Hamborsky, 75 D. & C.4th 505 (Pa.Com.Pl. 2005): in a potentially significant decision, the court decides that section 14 does not automatically deny bail upon prima facie evidence in support of a charge of a capital or life sentence eligible crime, but only denies bail if upon evidence presented at the bail hearing, the court concludes that conviction on the charge is likely; thus evidence of potential defenses must be considered in the bail decision.

See Grimaud v. Commonwealth, supra, 865 A.2d 835 (Pa. 2005), Article I, section 6.

Section 27--Eagle Environmental II, L.P. v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Environmental Protection, 884 A.2d 867 (Pa. 2005): The Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, upheld a regulation of the DEP which provided for harms/benefits analysis when determining whether a landfill permit should be granted. Eagle objected to conditions placed in its permit to operate a landfill, and claimed that the regulation providing for the harms/benefits test was beyond the agency's statutory authority. A divided Court, per Justice Baer, disagreed, in part because the agency's organic legislation sought to give force to Article I, section 27, and the harms/benefits analysis serves that purpose.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 870 A.2d 942 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): Commonwealth Court panel held, inter alia, that Article I, section 27, requires that the PUC take into consideration the historic and esthetic nature of a park in ordering repair of a railroad bridge, notwithstanding PUC regulations purporting to restrict the Commission's own remedial discretion.

Blue Mountain Preservation Association v. Township of Eldred, 867 A.2d 692 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): Article I, section 27 does not require local government to go beyond statutory requirements in protecting the environment and does not impose an affirmative duty to enact zoning legislation.

Article II:

Section 15--DeWeese v. Calkins Media, Inc., 70 Pa. D. & C. 4th 382 (C.P.Fayette February 16, 2005): Judge Leskinen denies media defendants' motion to compel discovery and/or for sanctions on the ground that the plaintiff had already withdrawn any claim that the defendants cannot defend without discovery of the House Minority Caucus Special Leadership Account, which the court finds is protected by the "speech and debate clause" of the Pennsylvanian Constitution--ArticleII, section 15--and thus cannot be compelled to be disclosed.

Article III:

Section 3--DeWeese v. Weaver, 880 A.2d 54 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): essentially reaffirmed Commonwealth Court's earlier ruling in DeWeese v. Weaver, 824 A.2d 364 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) that the bill codifying the DNA Act and amending the Judicial Code concerning comparative negligence contained "more than one subject" in violation of the State Constitution.

Section 29--County of Mercer v. Amundsen, 879 A.2d 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): divided court en banc holds that neither The County Code, nor Article III, section 29, nor Article IX section 9 prohibit the county from loaning money to the former County nursing home.

Section 32--D.C., K.C., and K.J. v. School District of Philadelphia, 879 A.2d 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): court rejects special legislation challenge to legislation providing for a transition center for certain students who have been removed from their regular classrooms, in school districts of the first class--Philadelphia is the only such district--before returning to regular classrooms, distinguishing DeFazio v. Civil Service Commission of Allegheny County, 756 A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2000). The court, however, also holds that due process--apparently both federal and state--requires an informal hearing before a student who requests placement in a regular classroom can be placed in a transition center.

See D.C., K.J., and K.C. v. The School District of Philadelphia, supra, Article III, section 20.

Article V:

Separation of powers--

In re Wilson, 879 A.2d 199 (Pa. Super. 2005): court en banc holds that citizen seeking judicial review of District Attorney's disapproval of private criminal complaint has standing to challenge trial court order sustaining such disapproval and that such further review does not violate the separation of powers. The proper standard of review of trial court deference to District Attorney in policy-declination case is abuse of discretion.

Section 10--Payne v. Commonwealth Department of Corrections, 871 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005): In prison condition litigation the court, per Chief Justice Cappy, held that: provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) providing requirements for dismissal of prison conditions litigation and PLRA provision providing for dismissal based on abusive litigation did not unconstitutionally interfere with Supreme Court's rulemaking authority; the court held that PLRA provision providing for automatic dissolution of preliminary injunction and PLRA provision requiring prisoner to pay costs when granted in forma pauperis status were unconstitutional as inconsistent with Supreme Court's rulemaking authority; the court also held that criminal provisions of obscenity law and department regulations banning obscene material were not unconstitutional.

Article VIII:

Section 1--Vees and Vees v. Carbon County Board of Assessment Appeals, 867 A.2d 742 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): Commonwealth Court held that school district appeal of assessment of property following recent sale, which led to reassessment of property did not constitute unconstitutional spot reassessment nor in any other way violate tax uniformity clause.

Section 2--American Law Institute v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 882 A.2d 1088 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): court, per Colins, P.J., holds that corporation benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate objects of charity and thus qualifies as institution of purely public charity pursuant to Article VIII, section 2(a)(v). Legal reform benefits society as a whole. Senior Judge Kelley dissents.

Article IX:

Section 9--County of Mercer v. Amundsen, see surpa, Article III, section 29.

Section 11--In re Municipal Reapportionment of Township of Haverford, 873 A.2d. 821, (Pa. Cmwlth., April 29, 2005): legislative redistricting standard in Article IX, section 11 requiring that districts be "as nearly equal in population as population practicable" requires no greater equality in districts than does federal Equal Protection. The court applied a 10% deviation "safe harbor" approach over Judge Pellegrini's dissent.