PENNSYLVANIA STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SUMMARY

Bruce Ledewitz

I. Methodological Provisions

Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 890 A.2d 1188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006): the court, per Cohn Jubelirer, using the 4-part Edmunds test, held that where the government uses excessive force to effect a seizure, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides no greater protection than does the federal Fourth Amendment. In light of the adequate remedy under section 1983, the court declined to recognize a cause of action for money damages for violation of Article I, section 8. On October 25, 2006, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied without opinion a petition for allowance of appeal of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision. PA Supreme Court Docket Number 95 EAL 2006.

In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238 (Pa., 2003): standing doctrine in Pennsylvania has no constitutional basis. Standing is merely a "useful tool" (Fn. 5).

Commonwealth v. Ardestani, 736 A.2d 552 (Pa. 1999): Commonwealth v. Brion held to apply retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal at the time of the decision--full discussion of retroactivity principles under the State Constitution.

Commonwealth v. Kilgore, 719 A.2d 754 (Pa. Super. 1998): Counsel ineffective for failing to raise search issue under the State Constitution. [This case may signal a new attitude toward the failure to raise state constitutional issues when federal constitutional issues are raised.]

Kleese v. Pennsylvania State Board of Funeral Directors, 738 A.2d 523 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999): Reference by party to "freedom of commercial speech" sufficient, even in the absence of citation to either the federal or Pennsylvania constitutions, to raise constitutional issue.

In re T.J,, 739 A.2d 478 (Pa. 1999): County mental health office has standing to contest decision not to extend mental patient's involuntary commitment despite mootness because the matter "raises an issue of an important public interest, and is an issue which is capable of repetition and yet apt to evade review"; administrative agency has standing to litigate matters that "touch [] upon its concerns'("citing Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Environmental Resources, 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989)).

In the Interests of R.H., 791 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2002): Plurality opinion holding that school police officers are subject to the requirements of Miranda warnings. Equally important, the plurality holds that once a case is decided on federal constitutional grounds, state constitutional grounds need not be discussed.

Commonwealth v. Crawford, 798 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001): Failure of media parties to appeal denial of intervention waives that issue; media parties otherwise lack standing to challenge "gag" order in juvenile death penalty case.

Commonwealth v. Hall, 830 A.2d 537 (Pa. 2003): The court upheld as constitutional a statutory permissive inference that use of an unlicensed firearm may be regarded as evidence that the defendant intended to commit the offense, here aggravated assault. The court upheld the permissive inference against due process challenge under the federal standard of County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 422 US 140 (1979). The court acknowledged Pennsylvania precedent applying a test for such inferences more restrictive than the current federal standard, but held that this caselaw applied federal analysis. The court declined to treat the Pennsylvania Constitution as more restrictive since counsel did not argue text, history or policy to apply a more restrictive standard under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Pennsylvania due process analysis therefore was treated as coextensive with federal analysis.

Wert v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 821 A.2d 182 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003): The court held that Pennsylvania constitutional claims presented in conclusory fashion, in a footnote, cannot be addressed because such a presentation does not explain the basis for the legal claim as requested by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

In the Matter of Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, 2006 WL 3800448, __ A.2d __ (Pa. 12/27/2006)--per Cappy, C.J., Court upholds condemnation of adult movie theater against First Amendment and Art. I, section 7 claims.  Court does not reach standing issue because, unlike treatment in federal courts, standing in courts of Pennsylvania is "nonjurisdictional and waivable."  For substantive analysis, see, infra Article I, Section 7.

Stackhouse v. Commonwealth, __ A.2d __, 2005 WL 3740572 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2/8/2006), the panel, per Judge Leadbetter, distinguishes between claims for damages and for affirmative injunctive relief, which were held barred by sovereign immunity, 1 Pa.C.S. section 2310, and claims seeking to restrain state officials from affirmative acts, which were not. The court did not appear to distinguish actions to enforce State constitutional rights at issue in this case from any other kind of claim.

Article III, §3--Single Subject

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has often stated that Pennsylvania does not follow the federal rule of Article III case or controversy doctrine in defining standing. Observers may have assumed that Pennsylvania had its own constitutional rule of standing and justiciability. In In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238 (Pa., 2003), Chief Justice Cappy stated for an unanimous court that standing doctrine in Pennsylvania has no constitutional basis at all. Standing is merely a "useful tool" (Fn. 5). Of course, standing requirements do exist and the appellant in Hickson was held to lack standing to seek judicial review. Nevertheless, the proclamation of a purely prudential basis for standing is an important step. And, since most federal justiciability doctrine is also grounded in Article III, there may be no constitutional basis for ripeness, mootness or political question doctrine either.

City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566 (Pa. 2003): legislation that pertained to a variety of unrelated subjects, involving local government, was enacted in violation of the single subject rule of State Constitution.

II Textual Provisions

A. Separation and Division of Powers

1. Executive and Legislative Powers

The Pennsylvania Constitution provides for a Governor and a General Assembly to exercise executive and legislative power respectively. Litigation about these powers generally is treated as a matter of individual rights and will be dealt with below. The General Assembly is treated by the Pennsylvania courts as a body of general legislative powers except where there are express or implied constitutional limits. This stands in contrast to the approach of the courts with regard to congressional power. There are numerous important ways in which Executive and Legislative powers under the Pennsylvania Constitution differ from those of the President and Congress--for example, the Governor has a line-item veto and the General Assembly must follow specified and detailed legislative procedures in order for a bill to become law. For recent caselaw, see the Recent Caselaw on Pennsylvania Constitution Web Page.

Legislative Power

Article II, §1--Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2005), see infra Article III, section 1.

Article III, §1--Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, (Pa. 2005): unanimous court per Chief Justice Cappy upholds most provisions the Pennsylvania Gaming Act providing for legalized gambling in Pennsylvania against a variety of constitutional challenges to the process by which the bill became law, including single subject and changes in original purpose challenges. The most important provision invalidated concerned the delegation of authority to the Gaming Control Board to consider local zoning laws but not to be bound by them. The court held that this provision constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because the permitted consideration was standardless.

Sections 1-4, see Stilp v. Commonwealth infra at Art. V, section 16.

Article III, §11--The Hospital & Healthsystem Association of America v. Department of Public Welfare, 888 A.2d 601 (Pa. 2005)--the court per Justice Baer holds that under the test enunciated in Biles v. DPW, 403 A.2d 1341 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979), which the court formally adopts, appropriation bill contained invalid substantive language in violation of State Constitution.

Article VI, §7-- Burger v. School Board of the McGuffey School Dist., 923 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 2007): per Justice Castille, the Court held that Art. VI, section 7, providing for removal of civil officers does not confer absolute authority of removal upon appointing bodies and, therefore, state statute governing, and limiting, removal of superintendents of schools is not unconstitutional.   

Article VIII, §3--DeWeese v. Cortes, __ A.2d __, 2006 WL 2786943 (Pa. 9/28/2006): in a unanimous Per Curiam order, without opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the order of Commonwealth Court, which had held that the bill that codified the DNA Act and amended the Judicial Code section relating to comparative negligence violated the State Constitution's single subject rule. 

Article VIII, §10--Stilp v. Commonwealth, 898 A.2d 36 (Pa. Cmwlth. 4/24/2006): Judge Pellegrini holds for the court that the Auditor General lacks authority to audit the spending accounts of the General Assembly for reasons of the separation-of-powers and that the current legislative auditing system satisfies the requirements of Article VIII, section 10. [It should be mentioned that in footnote 9 of the opinion, Judge Pellegrini cites this website for the content of the Debates of the 1968 Constitutional Convention and notes that other constitutional source material can be found on this website as well.]

Executive Power

Article II, §2--Perzel v. Cortes, 870 A.2d 759 (Pa. 2005): Secretary of Commonwealth, as officer of executive branch, lacks authority to question validity of writ of election issued by legislative branch officials pursuant to Article II, section 2.

Lawless v. Jubelirer, 811 A.2d 974 (Pa. 2002): The Pennsylvania Supreme Court per curiam, without opinion and without oral argument, affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court allowing Robert Jubelirer to serve simultaneously as Lieutenant Governor, State Senator and President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate. Justices Zappala and Nigro dissented from both the decision and from the failure to grant oral argument.

Article IV, §16 --Jubelirer v Rendell, 904 A.2d 1030 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2006): unanimous court per Colins, P.J., holds that Governor may use line item veto to remove substantive riders from appropriation bills as opposed to restricting the veto power to amounts of appropriations: "if the General Assembly can put it in, the Governor can take it out."

2. Judicial Power

Article V, Separation of Powers In re Randy Buchanan, __ A.2d __, 2005 WL 1943557 (Pa. August 15, 2005), a unanimous court, per Justice Castille, holds that courts have an inherent power to seal autopsy reports, which are otherwise required to be disclosed to the public under the Pennsylvania Coroner's Act, when the Commonwealth demonstrates "that release of the report would substantially hinder an ongoing criminal investigation."

Article V, §10

In addition to judicial power similar to that exercised by the federal courts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is granted a procedural rulemaking power in Article V, §10. All laws inconsistent with judicially prescribed rules are to be suspended. The court has also asserted, pursuant to Art. V, §10, the exclusive power to supervise the bar and the employees and officials of the Judicial Branch. See Kremer v State Ethics Commission (1983): unconstitutional to apply Ethics Act to judges as violation of the court's supervisory power; Court of Common Pleas v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (1996): PHRC may not adjudicate race discrimination claim by terminated court employee; Commonwealth v. Stern, 701 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1997): criminal statute prohibiting lawyers from paying referral fee declared unconstitutional as violation of court's exclusive supervisory power; Gmerek v. State Ethics Com., 751 A.2d 1241 (Cmwlth Ct 2000), affirmed by equally divided Court, 807 A.2d 812 (Pa. 2002) (Castille, J., and Zappala, J., joined by Cappy, J., for affirmance; Saylor J., joined by Nigro, J., and Newman, J., for reversal): Lobbying Disclosure Act held unconstitutional as violation of authority in Pennsylvania Supreme Court to regulate professional conduct of attorneys; L.J.S. v. State Ethics Commission, 744 A.2d 798 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (en banc): State Ethics Commission lacks authority to investigate a chief adult probation officer of the Court of Common Pleas because of the State Supreme Court's exclusive authority to supervise the Judicial Branch; P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 723 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1999): city solicitor subject to State Ethics Act; Commonwealth ex rel. Unified Judicial System v. Vartan, 733 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 1999): "Deliberative process privilege" held to bar subpoena of former Chief Justice in civil suit for breach of contract arising out of construction and lease of courthouse. Shaulis v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 833 A.2d 123 (Pa. 2003): A closely divided court held the State Ethics Act unconstitutional to the extent that it bars government employees who are also attorneys from representing clients before the employee's former employer for a period of one year after the employee leaves that employment. Justice Lamb represented the deciding fourth vote for the majority.

See also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jepson, 787 A.2d 420 (Pa., 2002): Pennsylvania Supreme Court has the authority to disbar a district justice for misconduct in the practice of law pursuant to Article V, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which grants the Supreme Court the exclusive power to supervise the conduct of attorneys. The court further held that the fact the Court of Judicial Discipline is also authorized to discipline judicial officers pursuant to Article V, section 18, of the Pennsylvania Constitution in no way abrogates the constitutionally conferred powers of the Supreme Court in disciplinary cases.

Abdulhay v. Bethlehem Medical Arts, L.P., 2005 WL 2416012 (E.D. Pa. 2005)--Judge Gardner holds, inter alia, that a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure can be procedural for purposes of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's constitutional authority to issue only procedural rules, but substantive for purposes of applying the rule in federal court pursuant to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The contrary argument "confuses two very different issues."

Payne v. Commonwealth Department of Corrections, 871 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005): In prison condition litigation the court, per Chief Justice Cappy, held that: provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) providing requirements for dismissal of prison conditions litigation and PLRA provision providing for dismissal based on abusive litigation did not unconstitutionally interfere with Supreme Court's rulemaking authority; the court held that PLRA provision providing for automatic dissolution of preliminary injunction and PLRA provision requiring prisoner to pay costs when granted in forma pauperis status were unconstitutional as inconsistent with Supreme Court's rulemaking authority; the court also held that criminal provisions of obscenity law and department regulations banning obscene material were not unconstitutional.

Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 912 A.2d 827 (Pa. 2006): per Newman, J. Court holds that Superior Court exceeded its authority by ordering recusal of the trial judge when no party had filed a motion to recuse; such an action interferes with the administrative and supervisory functions of the Supreme Court.

Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082 (Pa. 2007): in a plurality opinion joined by Castille and Baldwin, JJ., Justice Fitzgerald holds that the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law does not apply to an attorney's conduct in distributing settlement proceeds because to apply consumer protection statutes to attorney misconduct would "encroach upon this Court's exclusive power to regulate the practice of law" granted by the Pennsylvania Constitution; Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Baer, J., concur solely on statutory grounds; Justices Saylor and Eakin dissent.  

Article V, §13(b)

Brady v. Cortes, 873 A.2d 795 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): vacancy in Court of Common Pleas is to be filled by election rather than appointment pursuant to Article V, section 13(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution where primary and election for other open seats on the court are already scheduled to be held. "The 'ten month' provision of Article V, section 13(b) is not an absolute. . . ."

Article V, §16(a)-- Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2006), per Castille, J., for five Justices, upheld the July 7, 2005 pay raise and partially upheld the November 16, 2005 repeal of the pay raise, except for the repeal of the judicial increase, which was held to violate Art. V, section 16(a).

Article V, §17

In re Cicchetti, 743 A.2d 431 (Pa. 2000): in the future, court-appointed employees may not participate in judicial retention elections campaigns.

B. Individual Rights and Liberties

1. Rights That Parallel the Federal Constitution (Counterpart Provisions)

a) Article I, §1--Due Process (Civil)

Nixon v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, 839 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2003): amendment to Older Adults Protective Services Act disqualifying certain persons with criminal records from employment in facilities catering to older adults violates Pennsylvania Constitution's due process right to pursue particular occupation.

In the Matter of K.D., R.D., 744 A.2d 760 (Pa. Super. 1999): Mandatory psychological evaluation reversed as violative of mother's privacy rights pursuant to child dependency proceeding.

Pennsylvania landowners enjoy protections from zoning that are not recognized under federal due process, nor under the federal law of just compensation. For example, the landowner, under certain circumstances has the right of the natural expansion of a non-conforming use. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also held that amortization of a nonconforming use is per se a taking of private property for which just compensation must be paid. Pa Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board (1991).

b) Article I, §5-- Voting Rights

Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 447 (Pa. Cmwlth. CT 2000): Challenge to disenfranchisement of incarcerated felon upheld, rejecting plaintiff's claim that "suffrage is an inviolate right" for felons under the Pennsylvania Constitution but striking down provision of state law that deprived ex-felons who were incarcerated within the past five years of the right to register to vote under federal rational basis reviews.

c) Article I, §6--Right to Jury

1. Criminal Jury - Commonwealth v. Tharp: Unanimously upheld 1999 constitutional amendment of Art I, section 6, providing the Commonwealth in criminal case the same right to a jury as the defendant.

2. Civil Jury - After full Edmunds analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Section 6 requires a full, twelve person jury in a civil case, if requested. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993); Commonwealth v. One 1984 Z-28 Camaro Coupe (1992): right to jury trial in in rem forfeiture proceedings where owner claims the property is not contraband; Commonwealth v. Downey, 732 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999): denial of motion to poll jury made after verdict is recorded but before the jury disperses, held reversible error even without a showing of prejudice by the defendant; Wertz v. Chapman Township, 741 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 1999): civil jury trial provision does not require a jury trial in a damage action for sexual discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The standard for applying Article I, section 6 is, in part, whether a jury trial would have been available under such a claim when the Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted. The majority acknowledges that this test is narrower than that applied under the 7th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Grimaud v. Commonwealth, 865 A.2d 835, (Pa. 2005): Court, per Justice Eakin, upholds amendments to Article I, section 6 (Commonwealth right to trial by jury) and Article I, section 14 (bailable prisoners) adopted by the voters at the general election of 1998. In addition to other holdings, a four-Justice majority adopts the "subject matter test" as the proper standard by which to apply the separate vote requirement of Article IX, section 1. Thus, the proposed addition of two non-bailable categories to section 14--authorized life imprisonment and those prisoners for whom imprisonment alone will reasonably assure public safety--could be presented to the voters in one amendment. Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justices Nigro and Baer, dissented from this portion of the opinion.

Fritz v Wight, 907 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 2006)--per Justice Baer, reversed Superior Court and held that civil jury verdict with special interrogatories will be sustained where different groups of 10 jurors comprise the majority for different questions as long as some groups of 10 jurors agree on each interrogatory and on the final verdict.  Justice Saylor dissented. 

d) Article I, §7--Free Expression

Nor is there a complete ban of expression.  Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Castille, dissent.

See Payne v. Commonwealth Department of Corrections, 871 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005), Article V, section 10.

Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004): Court, per Chief Justice Cappy, holds that there is no "neutral reportage" privilege encompassed by Article I, section 7. Nor is such a privilege recognized under federal first amendment law. In concluding that there is no such privilege under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the court balanced the free expression guaranteed in Article I, section 7 against the right to reputation guaranteed in Article I, section 1.

Uniontown Newspapers v. Roberts, 839 A.2d 185 (Pa. 2003): Uniontown Newspapers attempted to obtain copies of Representative Roberts telephone records. Uniontown Newspaper alleged that it had the right to the telephone records pursuant to common law, state and federal constitutions. The court held that there is a common law right to examine certain judicial records, but not legislative records. Additionally, the court held that there is no First Amendment right to access legislative phone records. Furthermore, the court concluded that Uniontown Newspaper had no right to the records under the Pennsylvania Constitution, specifically Article I, section 7. The court held that although "Article 1, section 7" may be read to protect the right to publish information about the Legislature, it has not been so broadly interpreted to include a heightened right to gather information from the Legislature". Additionally, the court held that Article 1, section 7, "provides no more expansive rights of the press to access information than the First Amendment'.

Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, (Pa. 2002): per Justice Castille. On remand, a City ban on nude erotic dancing was struck down under Article I, section 7, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The United States Supreme Court had upheld the ban against a First Amendment challenge. Commonwealth Court continues to regard Pap's A.M. as not changing the basic constitutional analysis pursuant to Article I, section 7. In Piatek v. Pulaski Township, 828 A.2d 1164, (Pa. Super. 2003), the court upheld restrictions on a sexually oriented business under authority of precedents pre-dating Pap's A.M. and did not mention Pap's. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has suggested that under limited circumstances, Section 7 may have some application to private conduct. See generally Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986).

Insurance Adjustment Bureau v. Insurance Commissioner, 542 A.2d 1317 (Pa. 1988), per Flaherty, J., struck down ban on insurance adjustment solicitation of the public within 24 hrs. of a fire or other catastrophe. The case discussed primarily federal commercial speech cases, but ultimately propounded a state constitutional test prohibiting speech restriction "where the legitimate, important interests of government may be accomplished practicably in another, less intrusive manner."

In the Matter of Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 2006 WL 3800448, __ A.2d __ (Pa. 12/27/2006)--per Cappy, C.J., Court affirms the order of Commonwealth Court rejecting objections to the declaration of taking in the context of the condemnation of an adult movie theater as part of a 3-block blighted area; majority rejects a State constitutional free expression claim premised on Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591 (2002) because "unlike the Pap's matter, there is no silent, content-based reason that is 'inextricably linded' to the content-neutral reason of urban redevelopment." 

e) Article I, §8--Search and Seizure

Despite substantial similarity between the text of Section 8 and that of the fourth amendment, this is the parallel provision most consistently expanded beyond the protections of the Federal Constitution. In a number of cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has gone beyond the requirements of the federal fourth amendment in interpreting Section 8. What follows is a list of some of the more noteworthy cases.

Commonwealth v. Shaw, 564 Pa. 617, 770 A.2d 295 (2001) (requiring warrant for seizure of hospital-administered blood-alcohol content test results under Article I, Section 8 where warrant not required under Fourth Amendment)

Commonwealth v. DeJohn (1979): depositor has standing to challenge seizure of bank records, rejecting United States v. Miller (1976);

Commonwealth v. Sell (1983): defendant has "automatic standing" to challenge search in possessory crime, rejecting United States v. Salvucci (1980);

Commonwealth v. Melilli (1989): placement of pen register on phone is search requiring probable cause, rejecting Smith v. Maryland (1979);

Commonwealth v. Edmunds (1991): no "good faith" exception to exclusionary rule, rejecting United States v. Leon (1984);

Commonwealth v. Martin (1993): canine sniff of person and personal effects is search requiring probable cause, rejecting United States v. Place (1983);

Commonwealth v. Brion (1994): use of a wired informant in a defendant's home is a search under Section 8, requiring a warrant--no mention of contrary fourth amendment precedent, United States v. White (1971);

Commonwealth v. White (1995): search incident to arrest limited to person and immediate area rather than entire car, rejecting New York v. Belton (1981)--White also suggests but does not hold that there is no "automobile exception under Section 8;

Commonwealth v. Matos (1996): unsuccessful police pursuit of defendant is seizure and abandonment of contraband is coerced where reasonable suspicion was lacking, rejecting California v. Hodari D. (1991);

Commonwealth v. Carlton (1997): absent exigent circumstances, Section 8 requires knock and announce execution of warrant by police-relation to Pa. R.Crim.P.2007 and fourth amendment unclear;

Commonwealth v. Cass (1998): search of all student lockers at high school violates neither Art. I, Section 8- nor fourth amendment;

Commonwealth v. Alexander (1998): no warrant required for one-party consensual body-wire by patient in doctor's office-Brion limited;

Commonwealth v. R. Hawkins (1998): Sell's automatic standing permits a defendant to adjudicate suppression motion. Section 8 still requires a legitimate expectation of privacy;

Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1999): State Constitution does not require knowing and intelligent, as opposed to voluntary, consent to otherwise unconstitutional search; therefore, the Commonwealth need not show that the subject knew there was a right to refuse consent to the search;

Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1999): The court applies Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968), to uphold the admission of abandoned property into evidence, since reasonable suspicion had justified the original police approach. [The court had previously rejected California v. Hodari D., 499 US 621 (1991)--Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (1996)--and thus, required police justification even though the defendant ran away when approached by the police. There was, however, no majority opinion in Cook. Justices Saylor and Castille seem ready to overrule Matos. Chief Justice Flaherty did not state his position.];

In Re F.B., 726 A.2d 361 (Pa. 1999): upholds general search of high school students as precondition to entry to the school and sets forth framework for evaluating such searches under the State Constitution;

Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2000): in a case of apparent first impression, the court per Justice Castille, approves anticipatory search warrants under Article I, section 8;

Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153 (Pa. 2000): the court expressly adopts federal plain feel doctrine as a permissible ground for seizure of contraband under the Pennsylvania Constitution; the majority also rejects a categorical approach to frisks in drug cases, requiring instead independent justification for a frisk in each case.

Commonwealth v. Rekasie, 778 A.2d 624 1251 (Pa. 2000): A 4-3 decision that a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone conversation from his home with a confidential police informant and, therefore, the Commonwealth was not required to obtain a determination of probable cause before tape recording the conversation. The decision does not appear to change the underlying analyses of Art. I, section 8 cases, nor portend a closer following of federal precedent in search cases.

Commonwealth v. Polo, 759 A.2d 372 (Pa. 2000): Holds that Art I, section 8 prohibits the random stopping of a vehicle to conduct a drug interdiction investigation in the absence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Yastrop, 768 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2001): Bare majority upholds DUI roadblocks with objective standards, substantially following Michigan Dep't. Of State Police v. Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990), but applying State law to the standards.

There are many examples of adoption of federal standards, such as Commonwealth v. Gray (1985) (adoption of federal "totality of the circumstances" probable cause test for search warrants issued on the basis of information from confidential informants); Crouse, Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588 (Pa. Super. 1999) (court follows Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325 (1990) as the proper standard under the State Constitution and permits a "protective sweep" of a private home pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. [The court conducted a four-factor Edmunds analysis.])

In the Interest of D.M., 781 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 2001): Court adopts Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 US 119 (2000) as the proper standard for evaluation of investigative stops under Article I, section 8, of the State Constitution; therefore, in the future, unprovoked flight at the approach of the police may be considered a factor in deciding whether reasonable suspicion existed justifying an investigative stop.

Theodore v. The Delaware Valley School District, 836 A.2d 76 (Pa. 2003): the court held that policy authorizing random, suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of students seeking parking permits or participating in voluntary extracurricular activities would be constitutional under Article I, section 8, only if district made some actual showing of specific need for policy and an explanation of basis for believing that policy would address that need.

Commonwealth v. Duncan, 817 A.2d 455 (Pa. 2003): no reasonable expectation of privacy in name and address that would prevent police from obtaining that information from banking records associated with an ATM card. The court refuses to apply Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979), to merely identifying information.

Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007): the Court, per Castille, J., with Cappy, C.J., Baer and Baldwin, JJ., dissenting, held that the federal open fields doctrine, which generally does not recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in privately owned property outside the curtilage of habitation under the federal fourth amendment, applies equally to searches and seizures under the Pennsylvania Constitution; the opinions discussed at some length the appropriate use and structure of state
constitutional interpretation. 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275 (2007): the court, per Fitzgerald, J., reaffirms that Pennsylvania constitutional law does not follow the federal automobile search exception and always requires exigent circumstances in addition to probable cause to uphold an automobile search; Castille, J., concurring in the result does not consider the majority's rule to be settled and Saylor, J., joined by Eakin, J., would apply a modified automobile exception under Art. I, section 8.  

f) Article I, §9--Confrontation, Self-incrimination and Due Process (Criminal)

After full Edmunds analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the federal rule that use/derivative use immunity satisfies the right against compelled self-incrimination and that transactional immunity is not required. Commonwealth v. Swinehart (1995). Also after full Edmunds analysis, the court followed the sixth amendment limit and held that the state constitutional right to counsel does not attach until the suspect has been charged with the offense in question. Commonwealth v. Ludwig (1999).

The court had rejected the United States Supreme Court's acceptance of closed circuit television testimony by certain crime victims--Commonwealth v. Ludwig (1991). That decision appeared to have been reversed by constitutional amendment of Section 9 on November 7, 1995, but the amendment was nullified as a two subject amendment in Bergdoll v. Kane, 694 A.2d 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), affirmed 731 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 1999).

In Commonwealth v. Bussey (1979) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court required an explicit waiver of Miranda rights, rejecting North Carolina v. Butler (1979), but the viability of the distinction between implied and explicit waiver is not clear in recent case law.

Commonwealth v. Perez, 845 A.2d 779 (Pa. 2004): court abandons the bright-line rule that calls for "suppression of a pre-arraignment confession because it was obtained more than six hours after arrest". The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pa.R.Crim.P. 516(a), require that "a person who has been arrested shall be afforded a preliminary arraignment by the proper issuing authority without unreasonable delay". The Court explains that although this is not a constitutional mandate, it protects the constitutional rights of the defendant. After a lengthy analysis of the history of the bright-line rule, the Court determines that although the statement was made more than six hours after arrest, it was admissible.

g) Article I, §10--Double Jeopardy and Just Compensation

Commonwealth v. Martorano, 741 A.2d 1221 (Pa. 1999): applies the state constitutional double jeopardy standard of Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1999), ["conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial" 615 A.2d at 325], which is broader than the federal standard, to prohibit retrial in context of prosecutorial bad faith throughout the trial.

Commonwealth v. McFafferty, 758 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 2000): The State Double Jeopardy Clause, Art I, section 10, follows the dual sovereign rule, allowing punishment by two sovereigns for the same offense.

Commonwealth v. Sattazhan, 763 A.2d 359 (Pa. 2000): Court held that defendant's double jeopardy rights under Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, section 10, were not violated when, after defendant had received a mandatory sentence of life in prison due to jury deadlock, the State sought the death penalty during retrial.

In terms of just compensation, following reargument, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed itself, in effect, and held in United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Philadelphia (1993) that designation of a privately owned building as historic without consent of the owner is not a taking for which just compensation must be paid. The court utilized a full Edmunds analysis and understood that it was following the federal rule.

Adams Outdoor Advertising , LP. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Smithfield Township, 902 A.2d 469, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006): unanimous panel, per Simpson, J., holds, inter alia, that Township zoning ordinance requiring removal of existing commercial advertising signs on property where development is proposed does not constitute an amortization of an existing nonconforming use without compensation, and thus does not violate Pennsylvania Constitution; the court distinguished PA Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Township of Moon, 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991).

g.1) Article I, §11

See Weaver infra, Article I, section 28.

h) Article I, §13--Cruel Punishments and Forfeiture

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer (1983) that Section 13 is "coextensive" with the "cruel and unusual punishments" provision of the eighth amendment.

Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2001): After full Edmunds analysis, the court holds that the introduction of victim impact testimony does not result in cruel punishment.

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 833 A.2d 1220 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003): the court held that the forfeiture of defendant's vehicle was not grossly disproportional to defendant's guilty pleas to four felony counts of possession with intent to deliver a schedule I substance, and thus the forfeiture did not violate the constitutional prohibition against excessive fines.

Commonwealth v. Real Property and Improvements, 832 A.2d 396 (Pa. 2003): the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court opinion (see below) in an unanimous opinion. The court held that only the federal standard of gross disproportionality to the gravity of the defendant's offense applies to challenges to punitive forfeitures under Article I, section 13. The court overruled In re King Properties, 635 A.2d 128 (Pa., 1993).

[Commonwealth v. Real Property and Improvements, 2001 WL 1637507 (Pa. Cmwlth., December 20, 2001): the Commonwealth Court concluded that the eighth amendment and section 13 now require separate and different analyses for testing the constitutionality of forfeitures. The court described the eighth amendment test in terms of gross disproportionality and the section 13 test as requiring a substantial relationship between the forfeited property and the crime. In terms of section 13, the Commonwealth must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the property forfeited was used as part of a pattern of criminal activity and not a onetime occurrence. Since State constitutional provisions may not weaken federal standards, a defendant of necessity will be permitted to make claims of unconstitutional forfeitures under both constitutions. The defendant did so in Real Property and failed under both arguments.]

i) Article I, §14--Habeas Corpus

See Grimaud v. Commonwealth, supra, 865 A.2d 835 (Pa. 2005), Article I, section 6.

Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999): in the course of affirming the denial of P.C.R.A. relief in a death penalty case, the court applies PCRA to claims of penalty phase error on the ground, in part, that the prohibition against suspension of the writ of habeas corpus would prevent the legislature from foreclosing any claims that would have been cognizable on traditional habeas corpus review.

j) Article I, §17--Irrevocable Special Privileges and Impairment of Contracts

Cimaszewski v. Board of Probation and Parole, ___ A.2d ___, 2005 WL 442157 (Pa. 2/24/2005): Shifting four-Justice majorities join an opinion by Justice Baer to hold that the 1996 amendment to the Parole Act may be shown to violate the ex post facto clause, thus overruling Finnegan v. Pa. Bd. of Probation and Parole, 838 A.2d 684 (Pa. 2003). Particular facts must be presented to show that the amendment is likely to enhance a specific prisoner's punishment. Cimaszewski lessens, if it does not eliminate, the conflict between the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on this issue. It is clear in Cimaszewski, though never articulated, that the federal standard of ex post facto law in Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution is controlling interpretation of Article I, section 17.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Hoffman v. Township of Whitehall (1996) that adding a ten point credit to veterans' scores in seeking promotions in public employment violates Section 17.

Impairment of obligation of contract: Parsonese v. Midland National Ins. Co, (Pa. 1998) (retroactive application of statute making benefit designation of spouse ineffective after divorce would be violation of Section 17 and Art I, '10 of federal constitution.)

k) Article I, §21--Right to Bear Arms

Tsokas v. Board of Lic. and Inspect. Rev., 777 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2001): Upholds revocation of appellant's gun permit under the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 as a person "likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety" and noting in passing that the right to bear arms in Article I, section 21 "may be restricted in the exercise of the police power... ."

l) Article III, §32--Equal Protection

Although there is no equal protection provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution, the courts have interpreted several provisions to provide its equivalent. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that analysis and outcome under Pennsylvania equal protection is the same as under the Federal Constitution. It is not clear however, that outcomes under the State Constitution are always equivalent to federal law. See e.q., Defazio v. Civil Services Commission of Allegheny County, 756 A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2000). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a statute that provided for the Sheriff of Allegheny County to be the only county official in this Commonwealth without some discretion in hiring, firing or promoting his employees violated the equal protection clause contained in Article III, section 32, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court noted that it had repeatedly held that interpretation of equal protection is guided by the same principles that are applied in interpretation of the federal equal protection clause. The court held that there was no rational basis for the sub-classification of the Allegheny County sheriff.

2. Rights Without Parallel in the Federal Constitution

a) Article I, §1--Reputation

Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186 (Pa. 2002): Per Zappala, C.J., held that there is a right grounded in due process and Article I, section 1 (reputation) of the Pennsylvania Constitution to petition for expungement of a dismissed protection from abuse proceeding, even in the absence of statutory authority.

b) Article I, §11--Open Courts and Remedies

Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004): Court, per Chief Justice Cappy, holds that there is no "neutral reportage" privilege encompassed by Article I, section 7. Nor is such a privilege recognized under federal first amendment law. In concluding that there is no such privilege under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the court balanced the free expression guaranteed in Article I, section 7 against the right to reputation guaranteed in Article I, section 1.

Section 11 and several other provisions limit the power of the General Assembly to restrict recovery for injuries. The law in this area is complex. It is clear that whole causes of action can be abolished, especially when an administrative mechanism for recovery is supplied. On the other hand, it would probably be unconstitutional for the General Assembly to enact dollar amount limits for classes of damages. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Masloff v. P.A.T. (1992) that if a legal injury is recognized and a remedy provided, special standing restrictions on the remedy's use violate this provision.

c) Article I, §27--Environmental Protection

Section 27 provides a right, in very broad terms, to environmental quality and specifies the Commonwealth as "trustee of these resources." Despite its broad language, Section 27 has not had important effects in litigation. The Governor may not sue a private party for an alleged violation of section 27 without implementing legislation. Private parties can sue the government for alleged violations of section 27 without implementing legislation, but Section 27 is satisfied if all statutory protections for the environment have been followed, a reasonable effort has been made to reduce environmental harm to a minimum and the environmental harm does not clearly outweigh the benefits of the action.

White v. Township of Upper St. Clair, 799 A.2d 188 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct 2002): Article I, section 27, provides taxpayers and residents standing to enforce terms of dedication of public park.

Pilchesky v. Rendell, __ A.2d __, 2007 WL 2296155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 8/13/2007): in context of dismissing claims against Commonwealth-related parties, thus ending the court's jurisdiction, the court holds, inter alia, per Colins J., that land dedicated to use as a public park is not a "natural resource" and therefore its transfer for development does not violate the constitutional provision.

d) Article I, §28--Sex Discrimination

Weaver v. Harpster, 885 A.2d 1073 (Pa. Super. 2005): panel, per Montemuro, J., recognizes sexual harassment common law cause of action for at will employee who was not covered by Pennsylvania Human Relations Act because employer had less than 4 employees; court found public policy exception to at-will doctrine based in part on Article I, section 28 and Article I, section 11.

Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment has been applied in numerous cases, but without specification of any particular test. Nor is it clear that Section 28, when it is applied, requires any more, substantively, than does federal equal protection.

One way in which Section 28 does go beyond federal equal protection is that Section 28 does not require pure State action before it is applicable. Thus, the approval of an automobile insurance rate by the Insurance Commissioner is sufficient to implicate Section 28. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner (1984).

e) Article II, §7--Ineligibility of Office

Bolus v. Fisher, 785 A.2d 174 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001): relying upon Commonwealth ex rel. Baldwin v. Richard, 751 A.2d 657 (Pa. 2000), the panel holds that all felonies are "infamous crimes" under Article II, section 7.

f) Article III, §14--Public Education

Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999): the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Flaherty, with three Justices concurring in the result, affirms the dismissal by the Commonwealth Court of a challenge brought under Article III, section 14, to the Pennsylvania public education funding system. The Court agrees that such a challenge raises a nonjusticiable political question. [The same day, the Court, in a per curiam order, affirmed the Commonwealth Court=s dismissal of another school funding case.]

Hazelton Area School District v. Zoning Hearing Board, 778 A.2d 1205 (Pa. 2001): The court holds that under Article III, section 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that "the General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public schools", school district power cannot be exercised at the expense of the health, safety and general welfare of the community; the school district's statutory authority to rent its recreational fields for baseball games and practices has to be exercised consistently with local zoning regulations.

g) Article III, §26--Compensation

Denbow v. Borough of Leetsdale, 729 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1999): which prohibits "extra compensation" to public employees applies to municipalities, rather than just to the General Assembly, and prevents the Borough from granting the pay increases at issue in the case. [The applicability of Article III, section 26, to local government was an issue of first impression.]

h) Article III, §32--Special Legislation

Harrisburg School District v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079 (Pa. 2003): the court reversed an earlier Commonwealth Court decision, and held that a Pennsylvania statute allowing mayors of medium-sized cities to assume control of failing school districts violated neither Article III, section 32 (prohibiting special legislation) nor Article IX, section 3 (right of voters to adopt municipal form of government).

Pennsylvania Turnpike Com. v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 2006--Justice Castille holds for a unanimous court that Act that mandated the Turnpike Commission to engage in collective bargaining with first-level supervisors, but did not require any other agency to do so with regard to its first-level supervisors, is a special law in violation of section 32.

i) Article VI, §7--Removal of Civil Officers

South Newton Township Electors v. South Newton Township Supervisors, 838 A.2d 643 (Pa. 2003): the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that Section 503 of the Second Class Township Code, 53 P.S., section 65503 is unconstitutional. Section 503 provides for the "recall of a township supervisor". The court found this section to be in conflict with Article VI, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which "provides for the exclusive method of removal of elected officials."

j) Article VIII, §1--Uniformity of Taxation

City of Allentown v. MSG Associates, 747 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Cmwlth 2000): upholds different tax rate on services than sales against uniformity challenge under Article VIII, section 1. The Court expressly overrules Commonwealth v. Mercadante, 676 A.2d 1307 (Pa. Cmwlth 1996). The requirement that all taxes upon the same class of subjects shall be uniform is arguably the most important provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution. One of its consequences is that a progressive State income tax is unconstitutional. Another consequence of the requirement of uniformity is that there must be constitutional authority for the government to grant any tax breaks. Thus, the numerous exemptions and deductions with which the student is familiar from federal taxation are at least suspect, if not unconstitutional, under the Pennsylvania Constitution. One particular source of recent litigation has been the scope of the Constitution's permission to grant tax exemption to "[i]nstitutions of purely public charity."

Downingtown Area School District v. Chister County Board of Assessment Appeals, 913 A.2d 194 (Pa. 2006): per Saylor, J., striking down statutory preclusion of tax uniformity challenge if common level ratio is within 15% of estimated predetermined ratio and permitting taxpayer to introduce evidence of assessment-to-value ratio of similar properties.  Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Eakin, dissented.

k) Article VIII, §2 (v)--Institutions of Public Charity

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth (1985) that in order to qualify under this section, an institution must:

1) advance a charitable purpose;

2) donate or render gratuitously a substantial portion of its services;

3) benefit a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity;

4) relieve the government of some of its burden; and

5) operate entirely free from private profit motive.

It is still not clear whether most hospitals and universities qualify for tax exemption under this standard. See St. Margaret Seneca Place v. Board of Property Assessment (Pa. 1994);Wilson Area School District v. Easton Hospital, 747 A.2d 877 (Pa. 2000): upholds the tax exempt status of the hospital as "entirely free from a private profit motive" because all distributions of surplus revenue were made either with expectation of repayment or in order to increase the efficiency of hospital operations.

In Re Appeal of Order of St. Paul the First Hermit, 873 A.2d 31, (Pa.Cmwlth., April 22, 2005): the Commonwealth Court in holding that only portions of the Visitor's Center and Retreat House associated with the Shrine of Our Lady of Czestochowa were entitled to tax exemption as "[a]ctual places of regularly stated religious worship" the panel reiterated the holding of St. Aloysius R.C. Church v. Fayette County Board of Assessment Appeals, 849 A.2d 293 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) that places of religious worship may not seek tax exemption under more expansively applied "purely public charity" exemption unless facilities operate independently.

Alliance Home of Carlisle, PA v Board of Assessment Appeals, 919 A.2d 206, (Pa. 2007): in a thorough opinion per Castille, J., the Court reverses the denial of tax exempt status to a parcel of land containing an independent living facility owned by a licensed continuing care retirement community; the courts below had held that the parcel must independently satisfy the
constitutional and statutory standards for a purely public charity; the Court holds instead that the proper test of tax exemption for a parcel of land owned by an institution of purely public charity and closely connected to its charitable purpose, is whether the parcel is actually and regularly used for the purposes of the institution (or the statutory test that is the equivalent) and not whether the parcel would independently satisfy constitutional and statutory standards for tax exemption.

Section 2(a)(i)--Wesley United Methodist Church v. Dauphin County Board of Assessment, ___ A.2d ___, 2005 WL 3577518 (Pa. 12/30/2005): per Eakin, J., the court holds that a church parking lot may be granted tax exempt status as an "[a]ctual place of regularly stated religious worship..." if " reasonably necessary to the existence of the church..."; over Chief Justice Cappy's dissent, the majority rejected the categorical exclusion of church parking lots from tax exemption manifested in Second Church of Christ of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia, 157 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1959).

l) Article IX, §2--Local Government

Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 152 (Pa. 1996): per Flaherty, J., attempt to regulate assault weapons in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh held preempted by State law.

Hartman v. City of Allentown, 880 A.2d 737 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005): Unanimous panel per Jubelirer, J., held that amendment to city's human rights ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity was valid in that the ordinance was within the city's police powers, did not violate the home rule statute and was not preempted by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.

Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, ___ A.2d ___, 2004 WL 2785552 (Pa., December 6, 2004): Court, per Justice Nigro, held that Philadelphia's designation of Life Partnership as a marital status is not preempted by the State Marriage Law nor otherwise beyond the City's authority under its home rule charter; city could lawfully extend employee benefits to employees' same-sex life partners; but city could not prohibit discrimination based on life partner status where person who neither lives nor works in the city are eligible to register as life partners; and city's realty transfer tax exemption for life partners violates Uniformity Clause of Article VIII, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Consumers Education and Protective Association, International, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 808 A.2d 266 (Pa Cmwlth. CT, 2001): Because financial obligations are limited to currently available revenues, Philadelphia ordinances authorizing City to finance new professional baseball and football stadiums do not represent "debt" and thus do not violate debt limit contained in Article IX, section 12, of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Nutter v. Dougherty, 938 A.2d 401 (Pa. 2007): in a thorough discussion of Pennsylvania preemption jurisprudence, the Court, per Baer, J., upheld Philadelphia campaign contribution limits for local races despite State legislation in the area.  Cappy, C.J., joined by Fitzgerald, J., dissented.

C. Constitutional Amendments

Article I, §3

Grimaud v. Commonwealth, 865 A.2d 835, (Pa. 2005): Court, per Justice Eakin, upholds amendments to Article I, section 6 (Commonwealth right to trial by jury) and Article I, section 14 (bailable prisoners) adopted by the voters at the general election of 1998. In addition to other holdings, a four-Justice majority adopts the "subject matter test" as the proper standard by which to apply the separate vote requirement of Article IX, section 1. Thus, the proposed addition of two non-bailable categories to section 14--authorized life imprisonment and those prisoners for whom imprisonment alone will reasonably assure public safety--could be presented to the voters in one amendment. Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justices Nigro and Baer, dissented from this portion of the opinion.

Article V, Separation of powers

Bergdoll v. Commonwealth, 874 A.2d 1148 (Pa. 2005): By one sentence order, Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirms decision of the Commonwealth Court in Bergdoll v. Commonwealth, 858 A.2d 185 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) upholding the amendments of Article I, section 9 and Article V, section 10 allowing for legislative authorization of closed circuit television in certain child sex abuse cases.

Article XI, §1

Bergdoll v. Kane, 731 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 1999): Constitutional amendment to Article 1, section 9, which was approved by the voters on November 7, 1995, held unconstitutional as constituting in effect two amendments that should have been voted on separately. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the Commonwealth Court at 694 A.2d 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth 1997).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the amendment of Article IV, section 9, the membership of the Board of Pardons which was approved by voters on November 7, 1995, against claim that amendment violated Article IX, section 2 separate vote requirement. Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 565 Pa. 526, 776 A.2d 971 (Pa. 2001). The decision reversed the Commonwealth Court decision at 727 A.2d 632 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).

Grimaud v. Commonwealth, 806 A.2d 923 (Pa. Cmwlth. CT, 2002): Upholding State Constitutional amendments expanding bail availability restriction, Article I, section 14, and creating the Commonwealth's right to a criminal jury trial, Article I, section 6, adopted by voters at the November, 1998 election, against various challenges that the amendments were improperly submitted and passed.

Mellow v. Pizzingrilli, 800 A.2d 350 (Pa. Cmwlth., 2002): Court upholds the amendment of Article II, section 17, providing for election of a new State Senator when reapportionment creates a Senate district without a resident State Senator against various challenges to amendment process, including holding amendment was not, in and of itself, two separate amendments, and did not violate single amendment rule; Attorney General's plain English statement regarding constitutional amendment on ballot was proper, even though two joint resolutions of proposed amendments did not contain identical language.